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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce entered 
on September 20, 1988• This court has jurisdiction to decide 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
(1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. After an eleven-year traditional marriage in 
which the physician-husband pursued a lucrative career while 
the wife played a supportive role/ was it manifestly 
inequitable to exclude from the marital estate the value of the 
professional corporation, royalty rights, and a substantial 
portion of the retirement benefits the husband accrued during 
the marriage, when 67 percent of the remaining marital assets 
were also awarded to the husband? 
2. Is the fact that the wife enjoyed a standard of 
living beyond her own earning capacity during the marriage a 
permissible ground for awarding approximately 80 percent of the 
assets accumulated during the marriage to the husband under the 
standards established by the Supreme Court of Utah and this 
court? 
THE GOVERNING STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1988) provides, 
in pertinent part: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders relating 
to the children, property, and parties• 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married on December 17, 1977. They 
were unable to have children and the husband, Dr. Harold K. 
Dunn (hereinafter HDr. Dunn-), refused to adopt. Appellant 
Connie T. Dunn (hereinafter HMrs. DunnM) filed her Complaint in 
the district court on December 3, 1986, several months after 
Dr. Dunn repealed that he was involved with another woman and 
moved from the parties* residence. The Complaint named both 
Harold K. Dunn and his professional corporation, Harold K. 
Dunn, M.D., P.C. (hereinafter "the professional corporation"), 
as defendants, and both are respondents to this appeal. 
The case was tried on May 11 and 12, 1988, with 
closing arguments presented on May 16, 1988. On May 26, 1988, 
the district court entered its Memorandum Decision. On June 
10, 1988, Mrs. Dunn filed a Motion for Reconsideration and 
Clarification of Memorandum Decision. The district court 
denied that motion by Order entered September 7, 1988. On 
September 20, 1988, the district court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. The divorce 
was granted on the grounds of mental cruelty. Mrs. Dunn filed 
her Notice of Appeal on October 19, 1988. 
The district court awarded approximately 80 percent of 
the assets which the parties accumulated during their 
eleven-year marriage to Dr. Dunn.- Essentially, the court 
found that, although the parties had acquired substantial 
R000218-000223. See Appendix 1. 
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assets, the bulk of those assets should be awarded to Dr. Dunn 
because he had earned virtually all of the marital income. It 
held that the supportive role Mrs. Dunn had performed for 
eleven years had been sufficiently compensated by the high 
standard of living she had enjoyed as the doctor's wife, which 
it found -was substantially greater than she ever could have 
achieved on her own.M R000209-000210. Adopting Dr. Dunn's 
proposed distribution of marital assets, which was not admitted 
into evidence, it awarded Mrs. Dunn a minimal portion of the 
marital estate and three years' alimony, and denied her 
application for attorney fees. R000114, 000116, 000117, 
000218-000223, Trial Exhibit D-24, R000241 at 99. Mrs. Dunn 
appeals the property division. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. The Parties' Circumstances At The Time 
Of The Marriage. 
At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Dunn was 26 years 
old. She had been married briefly, but had no children. 
R000242 at 144, 149. She held an associate degree from the 
Stevens Henager Business School and worked full-time as a 
medical secretary. R000242 at 113, 145. 
Dr. Dunn was 39 years old, had been married previously 
for 17 years, and had two children. R000241 at 24. He was an 
associate professor at the University of Utah School of 
Medicine, and practiced orthopedic surgery at the University's 
Division of Orthopedic Services and at Shriners Hospital. 
R000242 at 14, Trial Exhibit D-22. 
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B. The Parties' Contributions To The 
Marriage. 
During the marriage, Dr. Dunn devoted virtually all of 
his time to his extremely successful career, working 60 to 70 
hours per week. He was promoted to full Professor in 1980, and 
became Chairman of the University's Department of Orthopedics 
in 1981. He continued to practice as an orthopedic surgeon, 
and incorporated Harold K. Dunn, M.D., P.C. in 1981. R000242 
at 22, 34-36. He served as a visiting professor at numerous 
institutions and published many articles on the constantly-
changing surgical techniques and devices in the field of 
orthopedics« R000241 at 39, Trial Exhibit D-22. At the same 
time, he served in committee and officer positions in the 
American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons ("the Academy"), and 
was invited to join the prestigious 12-member American Board of 
Orthopedic Surgery. He spent approximately two weekends a 
month traveling in connection with the Academy, the Board and 
other professional activities. R000242 at 13, 14-15, 121-122, 
R000241 at 43. Although he had earned his credentials and 
established an excellent professional reputation before the 
marriage, his most significant professional accomplishments 
followed his 1977 marriage to Mrs. Dunn, as reflected in his 
Curriculum Vitae. R000241 at 42-43, 46-47, Trial Exhibit D-22. 
Dr. Dunn also worked on the development of new 
orthopedic products during the marriage. Together with another 
doctor, he designed surgical instruments for the implantation 
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of an artificial knee known as the Miller-Galante knee, which 
was being marketed by Zimmer, Inc. ("Zimmer-). On December 1, 
1985/ he executed a License Agreement with Zimmer which 
provided fixed royalty payments in exchange for a license to 
use and sell those surgical instruments. Trial Exhibit P-4. 
In addition, he worked on the development of a hip device and 
consulted for Zimmer on spinal devices. R000242 at 44-45, 
Trial Exhibits P-5 and P-6. 
Dr. Dunn's income increased substantially during the 
marriage, rising from $71,381 in 1977 to $357,889 in 1987. 
R000242 at 187. Trial Exhibit P-l. During that time, 
Mrs. Dunn devoted herself almost exclusively to supporting her 
husband's career. She resigned from her secretarial position 
about 18 months after the marriage, in order to free her time 
to travel with him to professional activities, perform 
secretarial and bookkeeping services for him, and manage their 
domestic affairs. R000242 at 113-114, 155. When children did 
not arrive after seven years of marriage, she wanted to adopt, 
but Dr. Dunn, who already had two sons, refused to do so. 
R000242 at 19, 118. 
Mrs. Dunn traveled to meetings of the Academy and 
other professional associations, participated in their 
activities, and entertained Dr. Dunn's professional and 
business associates. R000242 at 12-17, 113-117, 184-185. 
After the professional corporation was formed in 1981, she 
performed secretarial and bookkeeping functions for it, as well 
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as for Dr. Dunn's family limited partnership and the parties 
personal investments, all without compensation. R000242 at 
10-12, 114-116, 118. She oversaw the construction and 
finishing of a large home which the parties built in 1984 
primarily to facilitate Dr. Dunn's business entertainment. 
R000242 at 19, 117. Throughout the marriage, she took full 
responsibility for the maintenance of the parties' home and 
domestic affairs, leaving the doctor free to pursue his 
career. R000242 at 12-17, 113-117. 
In short, Mrs. Dunn was totally devoted and faithful 
to her marriage for eleven years. R000242 at 119-120. There 
is no evidence in the record of misconduct or fault on her 
parte The marriage terminated because Dr. Dunn chose a new 
companion. 
C. The Parties' Circumstances At The Time Of 
Trial. 
During 1986, Dr. Dunn became involved with another 
woman, a 25-year old receptionist. After approximately eight 
months, he told Mrs. Dunn of the affair and moved from the 
parties' residence, indicating his intention that the marriage 
be terminated. R000242 at 6-9, 119-120. At the time of trial, 
Dr. Dunn was residing with his new companion, whom he has since 
married. R000242 at 8-9. At age 50, he is in excellent 
health. His gross income is approximately $30,000 per month, 
including the royalties from the surgical instruments designed 
during the marriage as well as the substantial income derived 
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from his medical practice and related work. R000242 at 21, 
1987 income tax return, Trial Exhibit P-l. 
After the parties' separation, Mrs. Dunn enrolled at 
the University of Utah. At the time of trial in May 1988, she 
had attended the University full-time for 18 months, was 
working toward a bachelor's degree in commercial recreation and 
tourism, and hoped to earn her M.B.A. Almost 37 years old at 
the time of trial, Mrs. Dunn testified that it will take five 
years of full-time study to complete her education, but she is 
experiencing medical problems which might delay her progress. 
R000242 at 112-113, 120-121, 135, 188. 
D. The Trial Court's Exclusion Of Substantial 
Assets From The Marital Estate. 
Dr. Dunn's professional corporation, royalty rights, 
and retirement benefits were the most substantial assets 
accrued during the marriage. Yet, the trial court excluded the 
entire value of the professional corporation and royalty rights 
and a substantial amount of the retirement benefits accrued 
during the marriage from the marital estate, without any 
compensating award to Mrs. Dunn. R000211-000215. Those 
exclusions totaled over $370,000. Trial Exhibits D-2, D-25, 
R000240 at 45-46. 
1. The Professional Corporation. 
Dr. Dunn is the sole shareholder and employee of the 
professional corporation which he formed in 1981. R000242 at 
34-36. His accountant, Keith F. Barnett, C.P.A., testified 
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that the net value of that corporation as of March 31, 1988 was 
$115,845. R000241 at 65. The balance sheet prepared by Mr. 
Barnett reflected $79,000 in cash, an advance receivable of 
$53,224 from Dr. Dunn, fixed assets valued at $11,435, and 
furniture valued at $2,500. Liabilities totaled only $30,314, 
leaving a net value of $115,845. R000241 at 62-65, 67; Trial 
Exhibit D-25. Mrs. Dunn's expert witness, Blaine Nelson, 
C.P.A., placed a higher value on the professional corporation, 
including a value for good will. R000240 at 21, Trial Exhibit 
P-17. The trial court found that no value should be attributed 
to good will, a decision which Mrs. Dunn does not challenge in 
this appeal. R000212-000213. 
The court also found "that the professional 
corporation has net tangible assets exclusive of good will, but 
those net tangible assets are not marital assets and are not 
subject to division in this action." R000213. Mrs. Dunn 
challenges this exclusion. Dr. Dunn's own expert considered 
the professional corporation to be a marital asset. See Trial 
Exhibit D-25. Indeed, the trial court even recognized the 
$53,224 advance from the corporation to Dr. Dunn to be a 
marital obligation. R000221. Yet, it excluded from the 
marital estate the entire value of the professional 
corporation's net assets, including the $53,224 advance and the 
$79,000 in cash, without any compensating award to Mrs. Dunn. 
R000213. 
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2. Royalty Rights Under The December 1, 
1985 License Agreement. 
The December 1, 1985 License Agreement entitles 
Dr. Dunn to fixed quarterly payments totaling $375,000 between 
1986 and 1990; $243,750 of those royalties remained to be paid 
at the time of trial. Trial Exhibit P-4, Article IV. 
Mrs. Dunn's expert, Blaine Nelson, calculated the present value 
of the remaining royalty payments at $232,572, based upon an 
8.5 percent discount rate. R000240 at 45-46. 
The royalties are Dr. Dunn's consideration for a 
license to use and sell the surgical instruments which he 
designed for the implantation of the Miller-Galante knee. 
Dr. Dunn developed those instruments during the marriage for 
Zimmer, which had the marketing rights to the Miller-Galante 
2/ 
knee but no appropriate instruments for its implantation.-
R000241 at 37-39, 123-124. 
The only conditions to the fixed royalty payments are 
that Zimmer not discontinue the instruments from its standard 
product line, and that its prior year's sales of the 
Miller-Galante knee be more than $40 million. Exhibit P-4, 
Article IV. Zimmer has been marketing the instruments and 
paying Dr. Dunn the fixed royalties under the Agreement since 
**-' Dr. Dunn had previously developed surgical instruments 
to be used in implanting a defferent type of artificial knee, a 
"dual patella knee" sold by Johnson & Johnson. Those 
instruments were not suitable for use in installing the 
Miller-Galante knee. The new instruments he developed to 
install the Miller-Galante knee did not incorporate the design 
of the prior instruments. R000241 at 37-39. 
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1986. R000242 at 40. Dr. Dunn characterized the royalties on 
the parties' joint 1987 income tax return as "installment 
payments from the sale of propertyoH Schedule D to 1987 Income 
Tax Return, Trial Exhibit P-l. 
Dr. Dunn testified that the December 1, 1985 Agreement 
was unique,, He explained that he had negotiated fixed royalty 
payments for the instruments rather than the more typical 
percentage royalty to be sure that he would be paid for the use 
of the surgical instruments as long as the Miller-Galante knee 
was on the market, regardless of the terms on which Zimmer 
marketed the instruments with the knee. By comparison, he 
referred to his license agreement with Zimmer for an artificial 
hip he is developing as a typical Zimmer royalty agreement, 
which calculates royalties as two percent of net sales. 
R000242 at 47-50, Trial Exhibit P-5, Article IV. 
The hip agreement, in which Mrs. Dunn claims no 
interest, expressly requires Dr. Dunn to Mact as a consultant 
for Zimmer and perform consultant services with respect to 
completing the development and design of [the artificial hip] 
and also with respect to making presentations about [the hip,]" 
including -participation in workshops and meetings.- R000242 
at 49-50, Trial Exhibit P-5, Article X. Dr. Dunn's consultant 
agreement with Zimmer concerning spinal devices, which expired 
shortly before the trial, also required him to participate in 
workshops and lectures concerning spinal systems and related 
instruments. R000242 at 51-53, Trial Exhibit P-6. 
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The December 1, 1985 License Agreement contains no 
such provision. Like the hip agreement, it requires Dr. Dunn 
to assist Zimmer in patent applications, infringement disputes, 
product testing and regulatory compliance. But unlike the hip 
agreement and consultant agreement, it contains no provision 
that would require Dr. Dunn to appear at seminars or to perform 
any other personal services in connection with the surgical 
instruments. R000242 at 47-50, Trial Exhibits P-4, P-5, P-6. 
Dr. Dunn testified that he had attended workshops in 
connection with the surgical instruments as well as the hip and 
spine devices. He estimated he had traveled approximately 28 
days in the previous year in connection with all three of his 
agreements with Zimmer, and that approximately three-fourth of 
that travel was in connection with the surgical instruments. 
But he could not identify any language in the License Agreement 
which required such travel or made it a condition of payment. 
R000242 at 40-44. 
The trial court found that, although the hip agreement 
required it and the December 1, 1985 Agreement did not, 
Dr. Dunn traveled in connection with both agreements and both 
would be "virtually worthless" without his continued services. 
On that basis, it excluded the entire value of the royalty 
rights under the December 1, 1985 Agreement from the marital 
estate. R000211-000212. 
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3. Retirement Benefits Accrued During The 
Marriage. 
During the marriage/ Dr. Dunn accrued substantial 
retirement benefits in three retirement plans: the 
professional corporation's Defined Benefit Plan, the 
University's TIAA-CREF Plan, and the Shriners Hospital Annuity 
Plan. The trial court's method of valuing those benefits had 
the effect of excluding from the marital estate substantial 
benefits accrued during the marriage. 
First, the court used a present value analysis without 
having evidence of the actual present values. It relied upon 
accountings which were dated as much as 15 months before trial, 
even though the evidence at trial established that substantial 
contributions had been made in the interim. The professional 
corporation's 1987 financial statement reflects that Dr. Dunn 
contributed $23,000 to the Defined Benefit Plan in 1987 alone. 
The amount of contributions made to Dr. Dunn's other retirement 
plans between the dates of the statements produced by Dr. Dunn 
and the time of trial was never determined. See R000102, 
R000214-000215, R000242 at 55-56, Trial Exhibit P-2, Item 548, 
and Trial Exhibit D-25. 
Second, the court granted Dr. Dunn credits not only 
for $43,173 in benefits he claimed to have accrued before the 
marriage, but also for projected earnings of $90,908 on those 
interests after the marriage. Those credits were granted even 
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though Dr. Dunn admitted he had made no effort to segregate the 
benefits accrued before the marriage and had no records 
identifying the rate of accrual or the contributions made after 
the marriage. R000214-000215, R000242 at 56-57, Trial Exhibit 
D-25, Schedule IV. 
Third, the court awarded Mrs. Dunn only a fixed dollar 
amount equal to one-third of the remainder, without making any 
provision for her to receive either an immediate distribution 
or accruals if the distribution were deferred and without any 
offsetting award of other assets. R000218-000219. As a 
result, Mrs. Dunn received substantially less than one-third of 
the retirement benefits accrued during the marriage, without 
any compensating award of other property. 
E. The Trial Court's Award Of Two-Thirds Of 
The Remaining Marital Assets To Dr. Dunn. 
After excluding Dr. Dunn's professional corporation, 
royalty rights and recent retirement benefits from the marital 
estate, the trial court also awarded Dr. Dunn two-thirds of the 
remaining marital assets. As reflected in Appendix 1, the 
result was to award Dr. Dunn approximately 80 percent of the 
marital estate. 
In addition to the fixed interests in the retirement 
plans, Mrs. Dunn received two cars worth $16,975, $5,646 of a 
promissory note having a balance of $33,785, an IRA valued at 
$11,023, $63,629 of the net equity in the parties' residence, 
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and $24,168 of the cash and securities held personally. 
R000218-000219. Thus, Mrs. Dunn received only about $265,000 
of a marital estate worth more than $1.1 million. See Appendix 
1. 
Dr. Dunn, on the other hand, received all of the 
remaining benefits in the three retirement plans, with a value 
in excess of $300,000, two cars worth $41,800, an airplane 
worth $30,000, the $28,139 balance of the promissory note, an 
IRA valued at $3,946, an interest in a Snowbird condominium 
worth $48,704, the $16,030 increase in the equity of a ranch he 
owned before the marriage, his $63,629 of the home equity and 
his $24,168 of the cash and securities held personally, as well 
as the assets of the professional corporation and all of the 
royalties payable under the December 1, 1985 License 
Agreemente R000219-000221. Altogether, he was awarded more 
than $850,000 in addition to his ranch, which has a net equity 
of $245,000. Appendix 1, Trial Exhibit D-25, Schedule I. 
The disproportion in the award of the remaining 
property resulted partly from the allowance of almost $150,000 
4/ 
in credits— for assets which Dr. Dunn brought into the 
*-' Dr. Dunn received the $79,000 cash held by the 
professional corporation, which was excluded from the marital 
estate. 
4/ Those credits include the $90,908 in projected post-
marriage accruals on $43,173 in retirement benefits Dr. Dunn 
claimed to have acquired before the marriage, a $26,000 credit 
against the airplane, a $22,493 credit against the promissory 
note, and a net credit of $6,600 against the automobiles. See 
Trial Exhibit D-25. 
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marriage# the proceeds of which had admittedly been commingled 
with marital property. For example, the court allowed Dr. Dunn 
a $26/000 credit for a premarital airplane which he sold for 
$10/000 after the marriage. Dr. Dunn testified that the Cessna 
210 Turbo which the parties owned at the time of trial was 
purchased in 1981 with a down payment of $6/500 from the 
proceeds of the sale of the prior plane. Both parties agreed 
that the $47,844 in installment payments on the Cessna were 
made entirely from marital income. R000242 at 63-66/ 134-135; 
R000241 at 28-29; Trial Exhibit P-7. Because 88 percent of the 
Cessna's cost was paid with marital income/ Mrs. Dunn's expert 
testified that its value in the marital estate was 88 percent 
of its stipulated value of $30/000/ or $26#400. R000240 at 
54. But the trial court allowed Dr. Dunn a credit of $26/000 
for the old airplane, reducing the value of the Cessna in the 
marital estate from $30/000 to $4/000. R000240 at 4, 68-69/ 
89-90; Trial Exhibit D-25, III. 
The court gave a similar credit against a promissory 
note which the parties held as joint property. In 1984/ the 
parties sold the condominium they had occupied throughout their 
marriage in return for a cash down payment and a promissory 
note payable to them jointly. They invested the cash in their 
new home/ and deposited the payments on the promissory note 
into their joint bank account. R000242 at 59-60/ 124-125. At 
the time of trial/ the note had a stipulated value of $33#785. 
Yet, the trial court excluded all but $11#292 of that value 
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from the marital estate, giving Dre Dunn a credit for his 
estimated premarital equity in the condominium. R000216. See 
Trial Exhibit D-25. 
Credits favoring Dr. Dunn were also given for 
premarital automobiles. Dr. and Mrs. Dunn both testified that 
they had sold the cars they owned before their marriage and 
commingled the proceeds with marital funds. R000240 at 31; 
R000242 at 149. Nevertheless, the trial court granted credits 
of $8,700 for Dr. Dunn's premarital automobile and $2,100 for 
Mrs. Dunn's premarital automobile. See R000240 at 88-89. 
The overall division of property, with the court's 
allowance of these exclusions and credits totaling over 
$500,000, gave Dr. Dunn approximately 80 percent of the marital 
estate, as reflected on Appendix 1. Since the court granted 
only three years alimony and denied Mrs. Dunn's request for 
attorney f€*es, its decision left her with extremely limited 
financial resources compared to those retained by Dr. Dunn. 
See R000218-000223, Trial Exhibits P-13, P-15 and P-18, and 
Appendix 1« 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court's property division was based upon 
an interpretation of Section 30-3-5(1) which is in direct 
conflict with the equitable standards established by the Utah 
suprme court. Under those standards, it was error to exclude 
corporate assets, royalty rights and retirement benefits valued 
-16-
at more than $370,000 from the marital estate, when 67 percent 
of the remaining marital assets were also awarded to the 
husband and there were no compensating factors favoring the 
wife. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); Lee v. 
Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987). Dr. Dunn's professional 
corporation and royalty rights should have been treated as 
marital property, Gardner v. Gardner, supra: Lee v. Lee, supra: 
Wilkins v. Stout, 588 P.2d 145 (Utah 1978), and all of the 
retirement benefits he accrued during the marriage should have 
been divided equitably. Gardner v. Gardner, supra: Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982); Marchant v. Marchant, 743 
P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). Moreover, the additional credits of 
almost $150,000 for assets Dr. Dunn brought into the marriage 
should not have been allowed, because the assets in question 
had admittedly been commingled with and treated as joint 
property during the marriage, and the credits rendered the 
overall distribution inequitable. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 
P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) . 
Awarding Dr. Dunn approximately 80 percent of the 
marital estate was manifestly unjust. Gardner, supra; Lee, 
supra. Since Mrs. Dunn has no separate property or income, was 
awarded only three years' alimony, and was required to pay her 
own attorney fees, there were no compensatory factors to 
justify such a disproportionate award. See Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, supra; Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 
1982). Certainly, there was no evidence of misconduct or waste 
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on her part. To the contrary, it was undisputed that she had 
devoted all her efforts during the eleven-year marriage to 
supporting her husband's career. See Savage v. Savage, 658 
P.2d 1201 (Utah 1988); Lee v. Lee, supra. 
The trial court based its disproportionate property 
division on the ground that, having enjoyed a high standard of 
living during the marriage as a benefit of Dr. Dunn's earning 
capacity, Mrs. Dunn was not entitled to share equitably in the 
property acquired during the marriage. This is not a 
permissible consideration under the standards established by 
the Utah supreme court. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 
1987); Savage v. Savage, supra: Lee v. Lee, supra. Under those 
standards, marital property must be allocated in a manner which 
best serves the interests of both parties and allows them both 
to continue a standard of living as close as possible to the 
standard they enjoyed during the marriage. Gardner v. Gardner, 
supra: Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). A spouse who 
contributes to the marriage by performing domestic duties and 
unpaid clerical functions is entitled to share in the financial 
assets accumulated with the working spouse's income. The fact 
that a spouse who did not work outside the home enjoyed a 
standard of living beyond his or her own earning capacity is no 
reason to deprive that spouse of an equitable share of the 
marital estate. Savage v. Savage, supra: Lee v. Lee, supra. 
Because it is based upon an improper ground and conflicts with 
the equitable standards imposed by Section 30-3-5(1) and the 
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case law interpreting that provision, the trial court's 
property division should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
A. It Was Manifestly Inequitable To Exclude 
From The Marital Estate The Value Of The 
Professional Corporation. Royalty Rights. 
And A Substantial Portion Of The Retirement 
Benefits The Husband Accrued During The 
Marriage, When 67 Percent Of The Remaining 
Marital Assets Were Also Awarded To The 
Husband. 
1. It Was Error To Exclude Substantial Marital 
Assets Without Any Compensatory Award To 
Mrs. Dunn. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) (1984) provides that 
H[w]hen a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the . . . property." The 
Utah supreme court has repeatedly held that since the statutory 
language contains no hint of limitation, all of the parties' 
assets, income, and potential earning capacity should be 
considered by the trial court in determining the most equitable 
way to serve the interests and welfare of both parties. E.g., 
Burke v. Burke, supra: Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 
(Utah 1978). 
While the supreme court has declined to establish a 
strict mathematical formula requiring an equal division of 
property in all cases, an award of 80 percent to one party 
certainly violates the equitable standard imposed by Section 
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30-3-5(1)• Indeed, if 80 percent awards were allowed, there 
would be no standard at all. 
Disproportionate divisions and exclusions of marital 
property have only been upheld by the Utah supreme court when 
there were significant compensating factors for the party 
receiving the smaller award. For example, in Mortensen v. 
Mortensen. supra, the award to the husband of all of the stock 
he had received from his parents during the marriage was 
upheld, since the wife was awarded two-thirds of the remaining 
property. IdL at 309. In Workman v. Workman, supra, the 
supreme court affirmed an award of 60 percent of the marital 
property to the wife and 40 percent to the husband, because the 
husband had been allowed to retain his entire pension without 
any alimony obligations. 14. at 933. Similarly, in Doau v. 
Doau. 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982), the court upheld the award of 
the entire value of a solely-owned professional corporation to 
the husband, because the trial court had awarded the wife 
liquid assets sufficient to offset the corporate assets. 
In the absence of such compensatory factors, the 
exclusion of valuable assets acquired during the marriage from 
the marital estate has been grounds for reversal. For example, 
in Gardner v. Gardner, supra, the trial court did not value the 
physician-husband's interests in a medical clinic and 
retirement benefits, but awarded them exclusively to the 
husband with no compensating award to the wife. The supreme 
court reversed and remanded for a valuation of the medical and 
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retirement assets and a redistribution of the marital estate on 
the basis of those findings. 
In Lee v. Lee, supra, this court reversed the award to 
the husband of a 52 percent interest in a business which was 
the principal asset of the marriage. It emphasized that since 
the wife had assisted in the operation of the business by 
performing clerical duties, and had allowed the husband to 
participate full-time in the business by assuming all of the 
domestic burdens, it was a clear abuse of discretion to award 
the interest in the business exclusively to the husband with no 
compensating award to the wife. 
Gardner and Lee are directly on point and require 
reversal of the district court's decision in this case. As in 
those cases, the trial court excluded substantial assets 
acquired during the marriage without any compensating award to 
the wife. Because it also awarded 67 percent of the remaining 
marital assets to the husband, the overall property 
distribution gave Dr. Dunn approximately 80 percent of the 
property acquired during the marriage. Mrs. Dunn had no 
separate assets or income, nor was she awarded long-term 
alimony to compensate for such an inequitable division. There 
was neither evidence in the record nor any basis in the law to 
justify such a one-sided result. 
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2. The Exclusions And Credits Which The 
District Court Granted To Dr. Dunn Are In 
Conflict With Current Utah Law, 
(a) The Professional Corporation Should Be 
Included In The Marital Estate, 
Given the recent decisions in the Gardner and Lee 
cases, there can be no doubt that the value of the net tangible 
assets of Dr. Dunn's professional corporation should have been 
included in the marital estate. Gardner established that the 
interest of a physician doctor in a professional corporation is 
subject to valuation and division in a divorce. Lee 
established that a wife who supports her husband's development 
of a business through secretarial and domestic support is 
entitled to share in its value when the marriage ends, even if 
he acquired his interest with proceeds of premarital property. 
In this case, Dr. Dunn's professional corporation was 
founded and its assets were accrued during the marriage. Those 
assets consisted of $79,000 in cash, an advance receivable from 
Dr. Dunn which, ironically, was treated as a marital 
obligation, and furniture and equipment acquired during the 
marriage. Under Utah law, the net worth of the corporation's 
assets reflected on the balance sheet prepared by Dr. Dunn's 
own accountant is an appropriate measure of the corporation's 
value. Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984); Lee v. Lee, 
supra at 1381. 
It was manifestly unfair to exclude those assets from 
the marital estate, leaving Dr. Dunn with the $79,000 in cash 
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and other assets of the corporation, with no offsetting award 
to Mrs. Dunn. From the time the corporation was established in 
1981, Mrs. Dunn performed bookkeeping and secretarial functions 
for it without pay. Because she assumed all of the couple's 
domestic burdens, Dr. Dunn was free to devote his efforts to 
income-producing activities. They are both entitled to a fair 
and equitable share of the financial assets accumulated by 
virtue of their joint efforts. See Savage v. Savage, supra at 
1204; Lee v. Lee, supra. Therefore, the case should be 
remanded for inclusion of the $115,845 value of the corporation 
established by Dr. Dunn's accountant. 
(b) Dr. Dunn's Royalty Interest Under The 
December 1, 1985 Agreement Is A Marital 
Asset. 
For the same reasons, Dr. Dunn's valuable royalty 
rights in the surgical instruments he developed during the 
marriage should also be included in the marital estate. In 
Wilkins v. Stout, supra, the Utah supreme court upheld the 
award to the wife of a one-third interest in royalties to be 
received by the husband on books he had written during the 
marriage. Other courts have also ruled that a wife has an 
interest in royalty rights on literary works and inventions 
derived from the creative efforts, time and skill of the 
husband during the marriage. E.g., Worth v. Worth, 195 Cal. 
App. 3d 768, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1987); Howes 
v. Howes, 436 So.2d 689 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 
441 So.2d 216 (La. 1983). See also Whatley v. Whatley, 439 
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So.2d 444 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983); Young v. Young. 472 P.2d 784 
(Wyo. 1970). 
The surgical instruments were completed and the 
License Agreement executed as of December 1, 1985. Dr. Dunn 
has been collecting royalties since that time, and has 
characterized them as installment payments from the sale of 
property. Under these circumstances, the $232,572 present 
value of the royalty rights under the December 1, 1985 License 
Agreement should be included in the marital estate, and 
MrSo Dunn should either share in the royalty payments or 
receive an offsetting award of other property. 
There is nothing in the License Agreement which 
conditions the payment of royalties on Dr. Dunn's conducting 
occasional workshops for Zimmer. But even if some occasional 
services were connected with the License Agreement, that would 
not be sufficient reason to exclude an asset worth $232,572 
from the marital estate altogether. See Gardner, supra; Lee, 
supra. Royalty payments on surgical instruments developed 
during a marriage are marital property, just as royalty 
payments on books written during a marriage would be. 
Occasional services to promote the surgical instruments do not 
change their character as marital property, any more than the 
occasional appearance of an author at a bookstore would change 
the marital character of books written during a marriage. See 
Wilkins v. Stout, supra. 
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(c) The Trial Court's Division Of Retirement 
Benefits Conflicts With The Standards 
Established By The Supreme Court And This 
Court. 
In the absence of competent evidence of their present 
value, the trial court should have awarded Mrs. Dunn an 
equitable share of the retirement benefits accrued during the 
marriage, to be determined by the trustee of each retirement 
plan under the provisions of the federal statutes for qualified 
plans. See Woodward, supra: Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830 
(Utah App. 1987); Marchant v. Marchant, supra. Instead, it 
awarded her only a fixed dollar amount of values which excluded 
substantial contributions and accruals during the marriage, 
with no provision for distribution. This was directly contrary 
to the rulings of the Utah supreme court and this court. 
It was error to award a fixed dollar amount based on a 
"present value analysis" without having competent evidence of 
the present value at the time of trial. The outdated 
accountings adopted by the trial court obviously did not 
reflect a present value. Dated up to 15 months before trial, 
they indisputably excluded substantial benefits which Dr. Dunn 
had accrued during the last several years of the marriage. 
In Berqer v. Beroer, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), the 
supreme court reversed a valuation of marital property based on 
such stale data. It held that an accounting made a year before 
trial was not admissible evidence on the value of a corporation 
as of the date of divorce, and a new trial was required to 
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determine the value as of that data. id. at 698. In Marchant 
v. Marchant, supra, the supreme court held that it was error 
for a trial court to award a wife one-third of the present 
value which the husband placed on his retirement benefits, 
without corroborating evidence. Under these rulings, the trial 
court's adoption of accountings dated up to 15 months before 
trial, which admittedly did not reflect contributions made in 
the interim, must be reversed. 
Furthermore, this court has stressed that a trial 
court may divide retirement benefits based on their present 
value only if it makes specific findings on both the present 
value and the reasons for an immediate distribution. Bailey v. 
Bailey, 745 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1987). See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 
738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987) (affirming the award to the wife 
of one-half the present value of the husband's retirement 
benefits, payable by him over five years with interest). The 
trial court did not make such findings in this case, nor did it 
order an immediate distribution of the amounts awarded to 
Mrs. Dunn. Indeed, the trial court's decision leaves it 
unclear whether Mrs. Dunn will even receive the accruals on the 
fixed amounts awarded to her in a deferred distribution. 
R000218-000219. The trial court denied Mrs. Dunn's motion for 
clarification of that issue. R000152 at 000161-000164. 
R000203-000204. 
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In Marchant v. Marchant, supra, this court held that/ 
in the absence of competent evidence of present value, 
retirement benefits should be divided according to a formula 
based on the number of years of the marriage divided by the 
total number of years in which the husband participated in the 
retirement plan. Such a deferred distribution based upon a 
fixed percentage was approved by the Utah supreme court in 
Woodward v. Woodward, supra. Given Dr. Dunn's failure to 
identify the present value of his retirement benefits, this 
matter should be remanded for equitable division of those 
benefits in the manner approved in Woodward and Marchant. 
(d) The Credits Grgntefl TQ Drf Dunn For 
Premarital Assets Violate The Recent 
Utah Case Authority. 
The trial court allowed almost $150,000 in credits 
favoring Dr. Dunn against the retirement benefits which he had 
accrued during the marriage, the automobiles and airplane which 
were purchased during the marriage, and the promissory note 
which Dr. and Mrs. Dunn held and treated as joint property 
during the marriage. See note 4, supra. Those credits violate 
the Utah case law defining the appropriate treatment of 
property brought into a marriage. 
Under that case law, a party to a divorce is not 
automatically credited with the claimed value of every item of 
property he brought into the marriage. See Burke v. Burke, 
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supra at 135. Where the identity of separate property is lost 
through commingling or exchanges, or where the spouse's conduct 
indicates his intention to treat the property or its proceeds 
as marital property, it becomes part of the marital estate. 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, supra at 307-308. Moreover, when the 
husband lacks accurate records to substantiate his claim that 
the value of properties held at the time of the divorce came 
from the proceeds of separate property, he is not entitled to 
credits against the marital assets. Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 
106 (Utah 1986). 
The credits for Dr. Dunn's premarital car and airplane 
were improper because those assets were used for family 
purposes and then sold. With the exception of the $6,500 down 
payment on the Cessna airplane, the proceeds were admittedly 
commingled with marital property. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
Supra at 308. 
The credit against the promissory note held jointly by 
Dr. and Mrs. Dunn was also improper, because property is not 
treated as separate "when the acquiring spouse places title in 
[the parties'] joint names in such a manner as to evidence an 
intent to make it marital property." Mortensen, supra at 307. 
The trial court's findings reflect that all of the proceeds of 
the sale of the condominium, including the note and all 
payments received on it, were consistently treated as joint 
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property by both parties. R000215. Under those circumstances/ 
the credit for Dr. Dunn's claimed equity in the condominium in 
1977 was inappropriate. 
Nor was Dr. Dunn entitled to $90/908 in credits 
against the retirement benefits he accrued during the marriage, 
when he had no records of the accruals and contributions since 
1977 and had never indicated any intention that those accruals 
constituted separate property. Teece, supra at 107-108; 
Mortensen, supra at 308. 
While each of these credits was inappropriate in 
itself, the principal issue before this court is the overall 
disproportion in the property division to which they 
contributed. In considering the appropriate treatment of 
property brought into a marriage, the overriding consideration 
is that the ultimate division be equitable — that property be 
fairly divided between the parties. E.g., Burke v. Burke. 
supra. The overall property division in this case does not 
meet that standard. 
Be The Fact That Mrs. Dunn Enioved A Standard 
Of Living Beyond Her Own Earning Capacity 
During The Marriage Was Not A Permissible 
Ground For Awarding 80 Percent Of The 
Assets Accumulated During The Marriage To 
Dr. Dunn. 
The trial court based its disproportionate property 
division on the ground that/ having enjoyed a standard of 
living beyond her own earning capacity during the marriage as a 
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benefit of Dr. Dunn's economic talents, Mrs. Dunn was not 
entitled to share equitably in the property acquired during the 
marriage. This is not a proper consideration under the 
standards established by the Utah supreme court and this 
court. 
There is no authority whatsoever for the trial court's 
premise that a wife's enjoyment during the marriage of a 
standard of living beyond her own earning capacity is a 
substitute for an equitable division of the property when the 
marriage ends. To the contrary, the Utah cases hold that a 
disproportionate property division will not be allowed in the 
absence of compensating factors, and the post-divorce living 
standards of both parties should be as close as possible to the 
standards they enjoyed during the marriage. Gardner, supra: 
Workman, supra: Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
Nor is there any authority for the trial court's 
premise that the economically gifted partner in a marriage 
should be awarded the bulk of the assets derived from his 
gifts. If that were the law, any non-working spouse who 
contributed artistic, domestic and other non-economic talents 
to a marriage would not be entitled to share in the property 
acquired during the marriage with the employed spouse's 
income. This would render Section 30-3-5(1) meaningless. 
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The district court focused almost exclusively on the 
financial contribution which Dr. Dunn made to the marital 
estate as a successful physician at the height of his career. 
In doing so, it failed to consider the numerous other factors 
delineated by the Utah supreme court for reaching an equitable 
5/ 
property division. 
There is no question that Dr. Dunn has completed his 
professional training and developed a lucrative career while 
Mrs. Dunn has not; that Dr. Dunn has tremendous earning 
capacity while Mrs. Dunn does not; and that Dr. Dunn has 
separate property in his ranch worth almost $250,000 while 
Mrs. Dunn has no separate property or income. The issue is 
whether the party who has such superior economic resources 
should be favored in the division of the marital property by a 
4-to-l ratio, particularly when the evidence establishes that 
5S The supreme court has defined the factors for the trial 
court to consider in fashioning an equitable property division as 
follows: 
The factors generally to be considered are the amount 
and kind of property to be divided; whether the 
property was acquired before or during the marriage; 
the source of the property; the health of the 
parties; the parties' standard of living, respective 
financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; 
the duration of the marriage; the children of the 
marriage; the parties* ages at time of marriage and 
of divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; 
and the necessary relationship the property division 
has with the amount of alimony and child support to 
be awarded. 
Burke, supra at 135. 
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the non-working spouse supported the development of those 
resources by performing clerical, social and domestic 
responsibilities. 
The disproportionate division in this case resulted in 
Mrs. Dunn facing a radical reduction in her financial resources 
as well as her standard of living, while Dr. Dunn's economic 
circumstances were barely affected by the divorce. Indeed, the 
trial court's decision rested on the premise that the parties' 
post-divorce living standards should not be equalized, and that 
Mrs. Dunn is not entitled to continue the standard of living 
she enjoyed during the marriage, even though sufficient 
resources are available to provide it. This is in direct 
conflict with the standard established by the Utah supreme 
court, that marital property be allocated in a manner which 
best serves the needs of both parties and allows them both to 
readjust their lives to their new circumstances as well as 
possible. Gardner, supra at 1078; Burke, supra at 135. See 
Jones v. Jones, supra. 
Mrs. Dunn was awarded alimony for only three years — 
not long enough to complete her education. The amount — 
$3,000 per month — is only 10 percent of Dr. Dunn's gross 
income for 1987. After payment of her attorney fees and the 
purchase of a modest home, Mrs. Dunn will have very little cash 
to finance the remainder of her education. Considering the 
limited assets awarded to her, the alimony clearly will not 
"provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
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standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.- Jones v. 
Jones, supra: See Rasband v. Rasband, supra at 1333 (HAn 
alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective post-divorce living standards and maintain 
them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage.") 
In contrast to the trial court's decision, the Utah 
supreme court has long held that a non-working wife is entitled 
to a fair and equitable share of the financial assets 
accumulated during a marriage. In the Savage case, for 
example, the court held that a wife who had not worked outside 
the home was entitled to share in her husband's business. It 
emphasized the very factors which the trial court rejected in 
this case. 
Virtually the entire present value of the 
corporation was developed during the marriage 
and, while it is true that the plaintiff took no 
responsibility for the business, it was her 
assumption of the domestic burdens which made 
possible the defendant's full-time participation 
in the business. She is therefore entitled to a 
fair and equitable share of the financial 
benefits accumulated by virtue of their joint 
efforts in the marriage. 
Savage v. Savage, supra at 1204. 
This court's recent decision in Lee v. Lee is also 
directly on point. The Lee case involved a nine-year 
marriage. Like Mrs. Dunn, Mrs. Lee brought minimal property 
into the marriage. Like Mrs. Dunn, Mrs. Lee quit her clerical 
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job after the marriage to perform unpaid clerical duties for 
the husband's business as well as the usual domestic duties of 
a housewife. Like Dr. Dunn, Mr. Lee brought substantial assets 
into the marriage. Moreover, he used the proceeds of some of 
those premarital assets to acquire the 52 percent interest in a 
business which he owned at the time of the divorce. As in this 
case, the trial court awarded the valuable business interest to 
the husband exclusively without placing a value on it, and 
awarded the wife other assets having a much smaller value. 
This court reversed and remanded to the district 
court, directing that the wife be awarded her equitable share 
of the business interest as well as other marital assets. It 
held that M[a] wife is entitled to a fair and equitable share 
of the financial benefits accumulated by virtue of the parties' 
joint efforts during the marriage." Lee v. Lee, supra at 1380, 
citing Savage, supra at 1204. Since the corporation was 
established "and its value was actualized" during the marriage, 
it was to be treated as a marital asset. Id. at 1380. 
The trial court's decision in this case cannot be 
reconciled with this court's ruling in the Lee case. It is 
based upon a policy consideration that is in direct conflict 
with the equitable standards established for the division of 
property in a divorce under Section 30-3-5(1). By denying the 
spouse who played a supportive role any meaningful share of the 
property accrued during the marriage and suggesting that the 
employed spouse is entitled to keep all the assets acquired 
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with his income, the trial court's ruling violates the 
fundamental precepts of Utah law governing marriage and 
divorce. It should/ therefore, be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the 
district court should be reversed and the case should be 
remanded for a redistribution of the marital estate in 
accordance with the decision of this court and the evidence 
presented at trial. 
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THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY DIVISION 
Net equity in residence 
Cash 
Securities 
Automobiles 
Airplane (portion paid 
from marital income) 
Promissory Note 
Interest in Snowbird 
condominium 
Marital interest in 
equity of ranch 
IRA Accounts 
Retirement Benefits 
Defined Benefit Plan 
TIAA-CREF Plan 
Shriners Hospital 
Annuity Plan 
Royalty interest under 
12/1/85 License Agreement 
Net Assets of professional 
corporation, including 
$79,000 cash, and $53,224 
receivable 
Advance payable to 
professional corporation 
TOTALS 
Mrs. Dunn 
$ 63,629 
10,687 
13,481 
16,975 
5,646 
Dr. Dunn 
$ 63,629 
10,686 
13,482 
41,800 
26,400 
28,139 
48,704 
$264,813 
or less 
than 24% 
115,845 
(53.224) 
In excess of 
$839,098 
or 76% 
Total 
$127,258 
21,373 
26,963 
58,775 
26,400 
33,785 
48,704 
11,023 
80,538 
39,271 
23,563 
16,030 
3,946 
Remainder, 
in excess 
of 163,516 
Remainder, 
in excess 
of 79,732 
Remainder, 
in excess 
of 47,841 
232,572 
16,030 
14,969 
More than 
244,054 
More than 
119,003 
More than 
71,404 
232,572 
115,845 
(53.224) 
In excess of 
$1,103,911 
Appendix 1 
